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Abstract—It is a popular challenge to design distance bounding
protocols that are both secure and efficient. Motivated by this,
many distance bounding protocols against relay attacks have been
advanced in recent times. Another interesting question is whether
these protocols provides the best security. In 2010, Kara et al.
analysis the optimal security limits of low-cost distance bounding
protocols having bit-wise fast phases and no final signature. As for
the classification, they have introduced the notion of k-previous
challenge dependent (k-PCD) protocols where each response bit
depends on the current and the k previous challenges. They have
given the theoretical security bounds for two specific classes k = 0
and 1, but have left the security bounds for k ≥ 2 as an open
problem. In this paper, we aim to answer the open question
concerning the security limits of 2-PCD protocols. We describe
two generic attacks for mafia and distance frauds that can be
applied on any 2-PCD protocols. Then, we provide the optimal
trade-off curve between the security levels of mafia and distance
frauds that determines the security limits of 2-PCD protocols.
Finally our results also prove the conjecture that 2-PCD protocols
enhance the security compared to 0-PCD and 1-PCD cases.
Index Terms—RFID, distance bounding protocol, relay attack,
security, trade-off.
I. INTRODUCTION
RADIO Frequency IDentification protocols, as a part ofwireless authentication, are commonly used in many
applications such as credit cards, toll payment systems, e-
passport etc. Since the communication occurs in the air, these
protocols are vulnerable to relay attacks in which an attacker
defeats the authentication system by only relaying messages
verbatim between the legitimate parties (generally a prover
and a verifier). The concept of relay attack was originally
proposed by Conway using a scenario called ”Grand Master
Chess Problem” in 1976 [1], and advanced by Desmedt et al.
in Crypto’87 [2]. Relay attacks can be simply classified as
mafia, terrorist and distance fraud attacks [3].
Based on the authentication protocols that include
challenge-response messages, mafia and terrorist fraud scenar-
ios can be defined as follows (Fig. 1). An adversary pretending
to be a legitimate prover (or tag) first gets the challenge from
the verifier (or reader) and relay it to the legitimate prover
which is out of neighbourhood at the beginning of attack.
After that she gets the valid response for this challenge and
forwards it to the reader as her answer. Some relay attack
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demonstrations and constructive considerations are given in
[4]–[6].
Fig. 1. Mafia and terrorist fraud scenarios
The aforementioned scenario that the prover has no aware-
ness of attack is an example of mafia fraud. In order to give a
more realistic illustration, we can think that mafia fraud attack
can be completed against the point-of-sale credit card terminal
although the credit cards are tamper resistant and certificated.
The remaining type of the relay attack is called distance fraud
attack where adversary has an ability to reach secret key (she is
a kind of dishonest legitimate tag) to convince the verifier that
she is within the neighbourhood whereas she is not. A typical
and easily comprehensible illustration of this attack is home
confinement that a person wears a bracelet and electronically
monitored. This person would make use of distance fraud
attack and leave his home temporarily without being detected.
(Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Distance fraud scenario
Researchers have developed two main approaches to miti-
gate relay attacks. One of them is related to measuring radio
signal strength (RSS) that the verifier measures this value in
order to understand whether the prover is close or not. On the
other hand, this solution suggestion is not applicable because
adversary can have the ability to adjust its signal strength
to persuade the verifier that she is in the neighbourhood
region. The other approach to prevent these attacks is focused
on calculating the round trip time (RTT) of the prover’s
response after a challenge sent by the verifier. The verifier
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checks the distance of a prover under favour of measuring
RTT of a signal. Upper bound for the speed of radio signal,
which has importance in this approach, can not be faster than
that of light. Brands and Chaum took the first step in their
seminal work [7] and they offered the rapid bit exchange
conception to design a protocol that includes measurement of
RTT in 1993. Afterwards, Hancke and Kuhn proposed the first
RFID-related distance bounding protocol [8], which does not
involve any final signature. These studies triggered the other
researchers and several distance bounding protocols that use
round trip time method have been proposed to increase security
conditions against relay attacks which are mafia fraud, distance
fraud and terrorist fraud [9]–[14]. We refer to [3] for further
introduction on distance bounding protocols.
It is still a popular challenge to design distance bounding
protocols that are both secure and efficient. In 2010, optimal
security limits of low-cost RFID distance-bounding protocols
are analyzed by Kara, Kardas¸, Bingo¨l, and Avoine [15]. They
focus on the low-cost distance-bounding protocols having bit-
wise fast phases and no final signature. As for the classi-
fication, they introduce the notion of k-previous challenge
dependent (k-PCD) protocols where each response bit depends
on the current and the k previous challenges. They provide
trade-off curves between the optimal security limits of mafia
and distance frauds for k = 0 and 1. The authors leave as an
open question to find the best the trade-off curves for k ≥ 2,
and they conjecture that the security should be enhanced when
k is increased.
In this paper, we aim at to support anticipations about the
open questions of k-PCD protocols (general extension). In this
respect, we analysis 2-PCD protocols and make attack resis-
tance calculations of this protocol against mafia and distance
fraud attacks. Our results show that when we increase the
number ‘k’, the security level of distance bounding protocols
enhanced as it is expected. We also demonstrate the results
calculated on software program and observe 2-PCD trade-off
curve below that of 1-PCD. The most important property of
previous challenge dependent distance bounding protocols is
that the current response bit in the rapid bit phase depends on
previous challenges as well. It is observed that the security
of protocols against mafia fraud and distance fraud attacks
improved without any supplementary overhead on the compu-
tation by virtue of k-PCD protocols can be succeeded. The
another expected properties of distance bounding protocols
such as resistance of channel errors in noisy environment
and preservation of privacy also provided by these protocols.
Moreover, mutual authentication is also made between prover
and verifier without generating any overhead in these pro-
tocols. In conclusion, development of k-PCD protocols has
crucial importance on RFID framework and this is what we
try to do in general of this study.
The composition of the paper is following: In Section II
we briefly explain the current challenge dependent (CCD)
protocols. In Section III, conjectures and open questions of
k-PCD protocols and some relevant definitions are given.
Section IV consists of our results and analysis related to
2-PCD protocols that answers the previous conjectures and
simulations that supports theoretical results.
II. CURRENT CHALLENGE PROTOCOLS (CCD)
In general, distance bounding protocols consist of three
phases; slow phase-I, fast phase and slow phase-II. How-
ever slow phase-II usually contains time consuming message
namely a final signature. Therefore, we focus on CCD pro-
tocols that have no slow phase-II as it is primarily defined
in [15]. For instance, Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol as an
example of current challenge dependent protocols includes
only the first two phases. In slow phase-I, parties interchange
nonces. After that, responses are generated by parties using
the same pseudo random functions. During the fast phase each
response ri only corresponds to a current challenge ci. This
protocol satisfies the following properties:
• During the fast phase, each response bit ri is computed
as ri := f(ci, y0i , ..., y
i
m−1), where ci is the i-th bit
and (y0i , ..., y
i
m−1) is the i-th string of the session secret
shared by both prover and verifier for i = 1, ...., n, where
n is the number of rapid bit exchanges. The response
function f is defined as: ri := f(ci, y0i , ..., y
i
m−1) =
ci.y
i
1
⊕
((1
⊕
ci).y
i
0)
• There is no final slow phase.
Final signature is not a compulsory phase for practical
solutions to suitable requirements of RFID tags. On the
other hand, these protocols are vulnerable to terrorist attacks
without final signature. However, CCD protocols satisfy some
security levels against mafia and distance frauds. Success
probabilities of mafia and distance frauds have the following
property [15]:
Pmaf + Pdis ≥ 32 .
III. k-PCD PROTOCOLS
k-Previous Challenge Dependent (k-PCD) protocol is a
natural extension of CCD protocols. In CCD protocols, the
response is only related to current challenge. On the other
side, the response depends on both current challenge and k
previous challenges in k-PCD protocols. This protocol satisfies
the properties below
• During the fast phase, each response bit ri is computed
as ri := f(ci, ..., ci−k, y0i , ..., y
i
m−1), where ci is the i-
th bit and (y0i , ..., y
i
m−1) is the i-th string of the session
secret shared by both prover and verifier for i = 1, ...., n,
where n is the number of rapid bit exchanges.
• There is no final slow phase.
Remark : From definitions, a CCD protocol can be thought
as a k-PCD protocol when k=0.
As a result, protocols that the response of the prover in
fast bit exchange phase depends on previous challenges are
more secure against relay attacks compared to CCD protocols.
Hence, k-PCD protocols are expected to reach the optimum
security against mafia fraud and distance fraud when k tends
to be infinity. This conjecture is generated from calculations
that take part in following sections.
IV. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS OF 2-PCD PROTOCOLS
In this section, we introduce and analyze the security of
2-PCD protocols. First of all, description of security regions
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for analysis of distance fraud attack is given in order to easily
comprehend the idea of the generic attack. Second, we receive
some help from different sets which defined in this section just
as used in CCD and 1-PCD protocols [15]. Then, we verify
optimum security limits for 2-PCD protocols against mafia
and distance fraud, and plot the trade-off curve for k-PCD
protocols where k = 0, 1 and 2.
A. Security Regions for Distance Fraud
k-PCD protocols are composed of two main parties; reader
and prover. When the subject matter is a distance fraud
attack against these protocols, another party called adversary
emerges in addition to main parties. In distance fraud attack,
the adversary has a right to access while staying on legal
authentication region. Besides, the adversary may stay on the
outside of this region and pretend to be in the authentication
region. In brief, distance fraud attacks are based on this
scenario in RFID framework.
When an adversary is outside of legal authentication region,
receiving and time requirement to receive challenges depend
on the distance between the adversary and bounds of this
region. Therefore, in order to make the analysis of distance
fraud attacks simpler, we describe four spherical regions
(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4) in which the adversary can communicate with
the verifier.
Fig. 3. Security Regions for Distance Fraud
TABLE I
DISTANCE FRAUD SCENARIOS IN DIFFERENT REGIONS
Where is adversary? What should she do?
Z1 She always access
Z2 Send ri before ci
Z3 Send ri before ci, ci−1
Z4 Send ri before ci, ci−1, ..., ci−k
While designing the distance fraud attack scenario we
assume that the adversary is in Z4 region since the dependency
parameter k is equal to 2. In the next subsection, calculations
of security limits of 2-PCD protocols against distance fraud
attacks are made based on this scenario.
B. Security Trade-off for 2-PCD Protocols
Let g be the response function that have inputs
ci, ci−1, ci−2, y and output response bit ri. To analyze the
distance and mafia fraud attack, we define a variable ay as
the equation below,
ay =
∑
g(ci, ci−1, ci−2, y)− 4
ci ∈ (0, 1)
ci−1 ∈ (0, 1)
ci−2 ∈ (0, 1)
Also we define the following sets:
A = y ∈ Fm2 : |ay| = 4,
B1 = y ∈ Fm2 : |ay| = 3,
B2 = y ∈ Fm2 : |ay| = 2,
B3 = y ∈ Fm2 : |ay| = 1,
C = y ∈ Fm2 : |ay| = 0.
a+ b1+ b2+ b3+ c = 2
m, where a is the cardinality of the
set A, b1 is the cardinality of the set B1, b2 is the cardinality
of the set B2, b3 is the cardinality of the set B3 and c is the
cardinality of the set C.
The set A includes the session secrets that produce the same
response bits ri. The other three sets B1, B2 and B3 are the
majority groups that have same response bits with probability
7
8 ,
3
4 and
5
8 respectively. Finally, set C has same response bits
in half.
Success probabilities of mafia fraud and distance fraud
attacks depend on the cardinality of sets in 2-PCD protocol.
Success probability calculations of distance fraud attack for
2-PCD protocols as follows:
Pdis =
a
2m
+
7
8
· b1
2m
+
6
8
· b2
2m
+
5
8
· b3
2m
+
4
8
· c
2m
=
1
2
+
4a+ 3b1 + 2b2 + b3
2m+3
Success probability calculations of mafia fraud attack for
2-PCD protocols as follows:
Pno−flipmaf =
1
8
+
7
8
· [ a
2m
+
3
4
· b1
2m
+
4
7
· b2
2m
+
13
28
· b3
2m
+
3
7
· c
2m
]
=
1
2
+
16a+ 9b1 + 4b2 + b3
2m+5
P flipmaf =
1
8
+
7
8
· [ 1
4
· b1
2m
+
3
7
· b2
2m
+
15
28
· b3
2m
+
4
7
· c
2m
]
=
1
8
+
7b1 + 12b2 + 15b3 + 16c
2m+5
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Success probabilities of distance fraud attack and mafia
fraud attack inversely related to each other. Trade-off curve
calculations between mafia fraud and distance fraud for 2-PCD
protocols as follows:
P flipmaf + Pdis =
9
8
+
3b1 + 4b2 + 3b3
2m+5
Pno−flipmaf + Pdis =
9
8
+
28a+ 17b1 + 8b2 + b3 − 4c
2m+5
This implies that, Pmaf + Pdis ≥ 98 . Thus, lower success
probability bound for the summation of both mafia fraud attack
and distance fraud attack is calculated as 98 .
TABLE II
MAXIMUM SECURITY LIMITS
DB Protocols Pdist + Pmaf ≥
CCD 3/2
1-PCD 5/4
2-PCD 9/8
rr
rr
rr
rr
r
r r r r r r r r
1/2
9/16
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11/16
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15/16
1
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Fig. 4. Trade-off Curve for CCD,1-PCD,2-PCD
As it is shown in the Figure 4 when the parameter k goes
the infinity k-PCD protocols will reach the ideal security level.
C. The Optimum Design of Mafia and Distance Fraud Attack
Algorithm Against 2-PCD Protocols
Compatibility between calculations and verification of dis-
tance fraud attack and mafia fraud attack with algorithms
provides huge contributions on the optimum security results.
We compare mafia fraud attacks max(Pno−flipmaf , P
flip
maf )
with an approximation (neglecting b1, b2 and b3). Then, this
approximation gives that optimum security limit for mafia
fraud is satisfied when c = 7a. So, it is clear that flipping
the response is more preferable under the condition of c > 7a
in order to learn each bit of register for an adversary.
We design a generic mafia fraud attack algorithm for 2-PCD
protocols which is given in Algorithm IV.1.
Algorithm IV.1: MAFIA FRAUD ATTACK FOR 2-PCD PROTOCOLS(n, a, c)
n: Number of rounds
flip: Deciding on flipping the response
Send a random challenge c′0 ∈ {0, 1} and c′1 ∈ {0, 1} to the prover
if c ≥ 7a
then flip← 1
else flip← 0
for i← 0 to n
do
{
Send a random challenge c′i ∈ {0, 1} to the prover
Record the prover’s response r′i
/*Then, Mafia continues the protocol with the verifier*/
Record first challenge ci−1 and second challenge ci−2 of the verifier
for i← 2 to n
do

record i-th challenge of the verifier in ci
if c′i = ci and c′i−1 = ci−1 and c′i−2 = ci−2
then Send r′i
else Send r′i ⊕ flip
ci−1 ← ci and ci−2 ← ci−1
We also design a generic distance fraud attack algorithm for
2-PCD protocols which is given in Algorithm IV.2.
Algorithm IV.2: DISTANCE FRAUD ATTACK FOR 2-PCD PROTOCOLS(n)
n: Number of rounds
c′0 ∈ {0, 1} and c′1 ∈ {0, 1}
for i← 2 to n
do

if ay = 3 or ay = 2 or ay = 1
Send 1
if g(0, ci−1, ci−2, y) = 1
if ci−1 = 0
then ci−2 ← 0
else ci−1 ← 0 and ci−2 ← 1
else
if ci−1 = 0
then ci−1 ← 1 and ci−2 ← 0
else ci−1 ← 1 and ci−2 ← 1
else if ay = −3 or ay = −2 or ay = −1
Send 0
if g(0, ci−1, ci−2, y) = 1
if ci−1 = 0
then ci−2 ← 0
else ci−1 ← 0 and ci−2 ← 1
else
if ci−1 = 0
then ci−1 ← 1 and ci−2 ← 0
else ci−1 ← 1 and ci−2 ← 1
else{
Send g(0, ci−1, ci−2, y)
then ci−1 ← 0 and ci−2 ← ci−1
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D. Simulation Results
We implement four different 2-PCD response generating
functions on HK protocol structure. We simulate the attacks
given in Algorithms IV.1 and IV.2 for each of them. The
simulation for each protocol is repeated 220 times with fresh
nonces. We have shown that the experimental results, which
are shown in Table III, are in parallel with the results obtained
in Section IV-B.
TABLE III
THE SIMULATION RESULTS FOR SUCCESS PROBABILITIES OF MAFIA
FRAUD AND DISTANCE FRAUD.
a
∑3
i=1 bi c P
flip
maf P
no−flip
maf Pdis
1 0 7 0.5626 0.5656 0.5626
4 2 2 0.3260 0.7942 0.8200
0 0 8 0.6242 0.4992 0.4969
0 8 0 0.4485 0.6818 0.7821
Note that, in all experiments we took b1 = b2 = b3 for the
sake of simplicity.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explained RFID distance bounding
protocols and briefly reviewed at current challenge dependent
protocols. We also introduced the notion of k-PCD protocols.
Thus, we have shown that when we increase the dependency
parameter ’k’, security level against mafia fraud attack and
distance fraud attack increase as they are expected. We have
supported these expectations by calculating success probabil-
ities of distance fraud and mafia fraud attacks for 2-PCD
protocols. On the other hand, trade-of curve of 2-PCD protocol
is plotted and compared with CCD and 1-PCD protocols.
We also prove the conjecture that the best trade-off curve
for k1-PCD protocols lies above the best trade-off curve for
k2-PCD protocols where k1 < k2.
We also claim that a general formula for k-PCD protocols
can be obtained but we also left this problem as an future
work.
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